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In the classical expected utility (EU) model, decision makers are assumed to
be ironmen. The risks that they take have no egect on their felicity before
the resolution of the uncertainty, which means that they have no anticipatory
feelings, no anxiety. Moreover, once the uncertainty is resolved, they evaluate
the ﬁnal outcome in a vacuum. In particular, they feel no disappointment
if the ﬁnal outcome does not attain their expectation. These assumptions
are contradicted by introspection. When one of the two authors prepares for
a marathon, he faces much uncertainty about his performance on the day
of the race. He may form beliefs about it during the three-month training
period. If he is optimistic, he will savor his expected success during that
period, but he faces the risk of being disappointed ex post if the outcome is
below his expectation. On the contrary, he may prefer to be pessimistic, and
thereby depressed during the training period, but with the potential beneﬁt
of performing better than expected on the day of the race, yielding much
rejoicing ex post. Similarly, suppose the other author forms his beliefs about
getting tenure. If he is optimistic about the outcome of the tenure process,
he extracts utility from this prospect but faces the risk of being disappointed
after the fact. Alternatively, he could be pessimistic and feel miserable, but
he is likely to be positively surprised. Similar illustrations can be described
in various contexts, from the anxiety generated by a chronic disease to the
performance of our private pension account.
In this paper, we take into account of both anticipatory feelings and dis-
appointment. Disappointment theory was ﬁrst introduced by Bell (1985).
Bell observes that the egect of a salary bonus of $5,000 on the worker’s wel-
fare depends upon whether the worker anticipated no bonus or a bonus of
$10,000. Bell builds a theory of disappointment on this observation, taking
the anticipated payog as exogenous. However, one diculty with this theory
is that everyone would prefer to have the most pessimistic expectation ex
ante, in order to eliminate the risk of disappointment ex post. Thus, Bell’s
theory is incomplete as a general theory of decision under risk. Gul (1991)
provides an axiomatic foundation for preferences that weight outcomes diger-
ently above and below an anticipated payog, which is deﬁned as the certainty
equivalent.
In this paper, we explore the idea that people anticipate the future be-
cause they extract pleasure from dreaming and savoring the good things that
1could happen to them. Anticipatory feelings and the formation of endogenous
beliefs were ﬁrst introduced in economics by Akerlof and Dickens (1982). In
their model, individuals have preferences not only over states of the world
but also over their beliefs about the state of the world. Furthermore, individ-
uals have control over their beliefs and select those to maximize their welfare.
Beliefs are therefore directly chosen based on preferences over those. Alter-
natively, Caplin and Leahy (2001) present a model in which individuals make
decisions given that they feel anxiety about the future. Thus, in their model,
individuals do not directly choose beliefs, but their beliefs are inﬂuenced by
their own actions. Similarly, Kopczuk and Slemrod (2005) examine the ef-
fect of death anxiety on individuals’ choice. Brunnermeier and Parker (2005)
and Gollier (2005) use a simple portfolio choice model to show how anticipa-
tory feelings can explain why people can rationally be more optimistic than
available information suggests they should be. In their model, individuals
extract felicity from being optimistic about the future while knowing that an
excess of optimism would induce them to take too much risk. As in Akerlof
and Dickens (1982), individuals choose their beliefs based on preferences over
those. One diculty with these studies is that individuals are systematically
biased in favor of optimism, which is counterfactual. A substantial fraction
of households do not hold any stocks and the equity premium puzzle would
be even more pronounced if individuals were systematically optimistic.
Our model combines Bell’s disappointment theory with Akerlof and Dick-
ens’ notion of anticipatory feelings. Disappointment is introduced by assum-
ing that the ex post utility is decreasing in the anticipated payog.T h e
pleasure extracted from anticipatory feelings is measured by the expected
future utility based on the subjective beliefs about the distribution of the
risk. We establish a link between these subjective beliefs and the anticipated
payog by assuming that the latter equals the subjective certainty equivalent
of the risky ﬁnal payog. The optimal subjective belief and its corresponding
anticipated payog is thus the best compromise between the willingness to
p r o v i d ep l e a s u r ee xa n t eb yb e i n go p t i m i s t i c ,a n dt h ed e s i r et ob ep e s s i m i s t i c
in order to escape disappointment ex post.
The idea that a reference point–the anticipated payog–is endogenously
determined relates our paper to K˝ oszegi and Rabin (2006), who develop a
model of reference-dependent preferences and loss aversion. The reference
point in their model is deﬁned as the agent’s expectations about the dis-
tribution of outcomes that are determined by his decision, which in turn is
2determined by his expectations. The reference point is then determined by
the assumption that expectations are fully rational and thus consistent with
the implied decision. In our approach, the reference point is endogenously
determined through the agent’s direct choice of beliefs. These beliefs are the
optimal solution that trades og ex ante savoring against ex post disappoint-
ment.
The aims of this paper are twofold. In addition to explaining the for-
mation of subjective beliefs, we derive a new decision criterion under risk.
Our preference functional is the maximum weighted sum of the subjective
expected utility generated from anticipatory feelings and the disappointment-
sensitive objective expected utility of the ﬁnal payog. We show that this pref-
erence functional is compatible with ﬁrst-degree and second-degree stochastic
dominance, but that it does not satisfy the independence axiom. Further-
more, it can explain the Allais’ paradoxes–the common consequence and
common ratio egect–if the individual’s degree of absolute risk aversion is
increasing in the anticipated payog. We then apply our decision criterion to
a simple portfolio/insurance decision problem and show that individuals are
more reluctant to take on risk than the EU model predicts. Our decision
criterion thus speaks to the equity premium puzzle and the preference for
low deductibles in insurance contracts.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we describe
the preference including the endogenous formation of beliefs. We describe
the characteristics of optimal beliefs and choice under these preferences in
Section 3 and apply them to a portfolio choice problem in Section 4. We
conclude in Section 5.
2 Description of preferences
Our model has two dates. At date 1, the agent makes a decision under
risk. Once the decision has been made, he forms subjective beliefs about
the ﬁnal outcome. These subjective beliefs can diger from the objective
probability distribution of the ﬁnal payog.H ee x t r a c t sp l e a s u r ef r o ms a v o r i n g
this prospect. At date 2, the agent observes the payog, which is a function
of his date-1 decision and of the realized state of nature.
We consider a set of lotteries with ﬁxed support {f1>f 2>===>fV}> where V
is the number of states of nature and fv is the real-valued lottery payog in
3state v. Without loss of generality, we assume that f1 ?f 2 ? === ? fV.
Let T denote a lottery in this set. It is described by a vector of objective
probabilities T =( t1>===>tV)i nt h es i m p l e xS of UV> where tv is the objective
probability of state v.L e t| denote the real-valued anticipated payog for this
lottery. We will formalize below how | is determined by the agent. Once
the state v is revealed at date 2, the agent enjoys a utility X(fv>|)f r o mt h e
lottery payog fv given the anticipated payog |.B e f o r et h es t a t ei sa n n o u n c e d ,
the agent evaluates his satisfaction that will be generated by consuming the
payog by the objective expected utility
HX(T>|)=PvtvX(fv>|)= (1)
We assume that the bivariate function X is at least twice digerentiable.
In addition, we assume that, for a given expectation |,t h ea g e n ti sa v e r s e
to risk on the lottery payog in the sense that the bivariate utility function X
is increasing and concave in its ﬁrst argument: Xf A 0a n dXff  0. Disap-
pointment is introduced into the model by assuming that X is a decreasing
function of the anticipated payog: X|  0. Any increase in the anticipated
payog reduces the date-2 utility. Your satisfaction of receiving a $5,000 salary
bonus is larger if you anticipated receiving nothing than if you anticipated
receiving $10,000. In the spirit of Bell (1985), we also assume that the utility
loss due to a given reduction of the actual payog is increasing in the an-
ticipated payog: Xf|  0. Increasing the bonus from $5,000 to $6,000 has
as m a l l e re gect on satisfaction if you anticipated receiving nothing than if
you anticipated receiving $10,000. Whereas condition X| ? 0 is a notion of
disappointment, condition Xf| A 0 is a notion of disappointment aversion.
At date 1, after having selected lottery T =( t1>===>tV)> the agent forms
subjective beliefs about the distribution of the ﬁnal payog.T h e s u b j e c t i v e
distribution S =( s1>===>sV)c a nd i ger from the objective one. This means
that the agent faces some cognitive dissonance in the decision process. Sub-
jective beliefs play two roles in our model. First, they determine the satisfac-
tion extracted at date 1 from anticipatory feelings. This level of satisfaction
is assumed to be proportional to the subjective expected utility of the future
payog that is measured by
HX(S>|)=
V X
v=1
svX(fv>|)= (2)
4Second, subjective beliefs also determine the level of the anticipated pay-
og. We assume that the anticipated payog equals the subjective certainty
equivalent of the risk:1
X(|>|)=
V X
v=1
svX(fv>|)= (3)
B a s e do nh i ss u b j e c t i v eb e l i e f s ,t h ea g e n ti si n d i gerent between the risky
payog of the lottery and the anticipated payog for sure. One immediate
consequence of this deﬁnition of the anticipated payog is that it must be
b e t w e e nt h es m a l l e s tp o s s i b l ep a y o g f1 and the largest possible one fV.
The agent selects his subjective beliefs and the associated anticipated
payog in order to maximize his intertemporal welfare Y , which is assumed
to be a weighted sum of the satisfaction generated by anticipatory feelings
at date 1 and of the satisfaction generated by the ﬁnal payog at date 2:
Z(T)=m a x
SMS>|
Y (|>S>T)=n
V X
v=1
svX(fv>|)+
V X
v=1
tvX(fv>|)( 4 )
v=w= X(|>|)=
V X
v=1
svX(fv>|)= (5)
Parameter n measures the intensity of the decision maker’s anticipatory feel-
ings. Observe that, in the process of forming his subjective beliefs, the agent
manages some cognitive dissonance. Namely, when computing his intertem-
poral satisfaction, he is able to take into account the role of his subjective
beliefs on his pleasure ex ante, and the objective distribution of the risk on
his pleasure ex post. The trade-og of the manipulation of beliefs is clear
from the deﬁnition of the intertemporal welfare function Y . The selection
of an optimistic subjective distribution S is good for savoring the risk ex
ante. However, optimism raises the anticipated payog |, which is bad for
satisfaction ex post.
Now, observe that program (4) provides a new decision criterion under
risk. It is characterized by the preferences functional Z. In the following sec-
tion, we describe the properties of the optimal subjective anticipated payog
1This assumption is consistent with Gul’s (1991) axiomatic theory of disappointment
in which outcomes below the objective certainty equivalent are weighted more than those
above that threshold.
5| and of the preferences functional Z. Both are deﬁned by (4), whose main
ingredient is the bivariate von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function X= Be-
fore proceeding to the examination of this general model, let us provide three
particular speciﬁcations that satisfy the assumptions that we made about X:
1. Bell’s speciﬁcation with X(f>|)=x(f)+j(x(f)  x(|))> with x and
j being two increasing and concave functions, and  being a positive
scalar. In this case, x(f)x(|) measures the intensity of elation. When
it is negative, its absolute value measures the intensity of disappoint-
ment. The psychological satisfaction associated with elation is an in-
creasing and concave function j(=) of its intensity.
2. Additive habit speciﬁcation with X(f>|)=x(f  |), with x being in-
creasing and concave, and  being a positive scalar. In this case, a unit
increase in expectation | has an impact on ﬁnal utility that is equiva-
lent to a  r e d u c t i o ni nt h ea c t u a lp a y o g. This speciﬁcation is similar to
the idea of consumption habit formation developed by Constantinides
(1990) in which a unit increase in the level of past consumption habit
has an impact on current utility equivalent to a  reduction in con-
sumption. Exactly as habits “eat” some of the current consumption in
Constantinides’ model, expectations “eat” some of the ﬁnal payog in
this speciﬁcation of our model.
3. Multiplicative habit speciﬁcation with X(f>|)=x(f|3)> with x be-
ing increasing and concave, and  being a scalar belonging to interval
[0>1]. This case is similar to the previous one, with  representing the
percentage reduction in the actual payog that has an egect on utility
equivalent to a one percent increase in the anticipated payog.
3 Properties of the optimal anticipated pay-
og and preference functional
The structure of our model is such that all subjective beliefs S yielding the
same subjective certainty equivalent generate the same intertemporal welfare
Y . This implies that the optimal subjective beliefs are undeterminable. By
6using constraint (5), we can rewrite our problem as
Z(T)= m a x
f1$|$fV
I(|;T)=ny(|)+
V X
v=1
tvX(fv>|)> (6)
where function y is deﬁned in such a way that y(|)=X(|>|)f o ra l l|.N o t i c e
that y(f) is the utility generated by payog f when it is perfectly in line with
the expectation. Limiting | to belong to the support [f1>f V] guarantees
that there exists a subjective distribution S satisfying condition (5) for the
solution of program (6). Let |W = |W(T) denote the anticipated payog that
solves the above program. Any subjective beliefs S that satisfy condition (5)
with | = |W will be an optimal subjective distribution. Only when there are
only two states of nature will this condition yield a unique optimal subjective
distribution associated with |W.
At this stage, let us assume that the objective function I in program (6)
is concave in the decision variable |. Notice that this is not guaranteed by
our initial assumptions, since X is not assumed to be concave in its second
argument. Assuming the concavity of I, the ﬁrst-order condition, which is
written as
I|(|
W>T)=ny
0(|
W)+
V X
v=1
tvX|(fv>|
W)
;
?
=
 0 li |W = f1
=0 li |W 5 [f1>f V]
 0 li |W = fV
> (7)
is necessary and sucient for the optimality of |W=
Parameter n depends upon both psychological and contextual elements.
People who are more sensitive to anticipatory feelings have a larger n.I f
the duration of the period separating the decision and the resolution of the
uncertainty is increased, people have more time to savor their dream, which
also implies a larger n. It is interesting to examine the egect of an increase
in n on the optimal anticipated payog.
Proposition 1 An increase in the intensity of anticipatory feelings weakly
increases the optimal anticipated payog.
Proof: The local second-order condition to program (6) implies that I||
is negative. It implies that the sign of g|W@gn i st h es a m ea st h es i g no fI|n.
Since I|n = y0(|W) A 0> we obtain the result.¥
7When the intensity of anticipatory feelings increases, people get more
beneﬁts from their dream. This provides more incentive to distort their
beliefs in favor of optimism.
3.1 The characteristics of the optimal anticipated pay-
og
In this section, we examine how the optimal expectations are inﬂuenced by
the objective probability distribution, i.e., we examine the characteristics of
function |W(T). The intuition suggests that a deterioration in the objective
risk should reduce the optimal expectation. To determine whether this pre-
diction holds in this model, we examine the two classical sets of change in
risk that are welfare-deteriorating: ﬁrst-degree stochastic dominance (FSD)
and Rothschild-Stiglitz increases in risk (IR).
Proposition 2 Any change that deteriorates the objective risk in the sense
of ﬁrst-degree stochastic dominance weakly reduces the optimal expectation
|W. Any increase in the objective risk in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz
weakly reduces (resp. raises) the optimal expectation |W if X| is concave (resp.
convex) in the actual payog.
Proof: Consider two distributions, Td and Te. We consider a smooth
change from Td to Te with a parametrized probability vector T(), with
T(0) = Td and T(1) = Te. We assume that the objective state probabilities
tv() are continuous in . Consider ﬁrst the case of a marginal FSD deterio-
ration, with Te being FSD-dominated by Td. This implies that there exists
a smooth process T()f r o mTd to Te such that any marginal increase in 
deteriorates T() in the sense of FSD, which means by deﬁnition that the
expected value of any nondecreasing function of the actual payog is a nonin-
creasing function of . The optimal expectation |() satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order
condition I|(|()>T()) = 0 for all  5 [0>1]= B e c a u s ew ea s s u m et h a tt h e
second-order condition is satisﬁed (I|| ? 0), the sign of |0()i st h es a m ea s
the sign of
g
g
V X
v=1
tv()X|(fv>|())=
8By disappointment aversion, we know that X| is nondecreasing in its ﬁrst
argument. Thus, by deﬁnition of FSD, we obtain that |0()i sn o n p o s i -
tive. Because |(0) = |W(Td)a n d|(1) = |W(Te)> we obtain that |W(Te)i s
weakly smaller than |W(Td): any FSD deterioration in the objective dis-
tribution weakly reduces the optimal anticipated payog. The proof for a
marginal increase in risk is completely symmetric, and is therefore skipped.
A Rothschild-Stiglitz increase in risk reduces (resp. increases) the expected
value of any concave (resp. convex) function of the ﬁnal payog. ¥
The fact that any FSD deterioration in the objective risk reduces the
optimal expectation |W is a direct consequence of disappointment aversion
(Xf|  0). Had we assumed the opposite sign for the cross derivative of
the utility function, any FSD deterioration in the objective risk would have
increased the optimal anticipated payog.T h ee gect of an increase in risk on
|W is more problematic, since its sign depends upon whether Xff| is positive
or negative. It may be useful to examine our particular speciﬁcations for X
to provide more insights on this question. For example, the additive habit
speciﬁcation yields Xff|(f>|)=x000(f|). Thus, under the well-accepted
assumption of prudence (Kimball, 1990), x000 is positive and X| is concave
in its ﬁrst argument, implying that any Rothschild-Stiglitz increase in the
objective risk reduces the optimal anticipated payog. Prudent people have
lower expectations due to the riskiness of the lottery.
3.2 The characteristics of the preference functional
In the next proposition, we show that the preference functional Z satisﬁes
the minimal requirement of second-degree stochastic dominance. Remember
that second-degree stochastic dominance has ﬁrst-degree stochastic domi-
nance and Rothschild-Stiglitz increase in risk as particular cases.2
Proposition 3 Any second-degree stochastically dominated shift in the ob-
jective distribution T weakly reduces the agent’s intertemporal welfare Z.
Proof: Consider two objective distributions Td and Te such that Te is
dominated by Td in the sense of second-degree stochastic dominance. We
2Notice that this proposition would not necessarily hold if the constraints on | would
depend on the characteristics of the objective distribution T.
9have to prove that Z(Te)i sw e a k l ys m a l l e rt h a nZ(Td) .B e c a u s ew ea s s u m e
that X is increasing and concave in its ﬁrst argument, this implies that
V X
v=1
t
e
vX(fv>|) 
V X
v=1
t
d
vX(fv>|)> (8)
for all |. Applying this for |e = |W(Te)> we obtain that
Z(Te)=ny(|e)+
PV
v=1 te
vX(fv>|e)
 ny(|e)+
PV
v=1 td
vX(fv>|e)
 ny(|d)+
PV
v=1 td
vX(fv>|d)
= Z(Td)=
The ﬁrst inequality is condition (8) applied for | = |e> whereas the second
inequality comes from the fact that |d is the optimal anticipated payog for
objective risk Td. ¥
To get more insights on the characteristics of the preference functional
Z that this model generates, let us rewrite Z as follows:
Z(t1>===>tV)=
V X
v=1
tvP(fv>T)> (9)
where functional P is deﬁned as:
P(f>T)=ny(|
W(T)) + X(f>|
W(T))= (10)
Notice that P is what Pachina (1982) deﬁned as the “local utility function.”
Because the shape of P with respect to f w i l li ng e n e r a ld e p e n du p o nt h e
objective distribution T, our preference functional does not satisfy the inde-
pendence axiom. Our model is a special case of the Machina’s Generalized
Expected Utility (GEU) model. But rather than postulating the existence
of a smooth local utility function P(f>T), we derive P as a rational mental
process based on both anxiety and fear of disappointment, whose impact
on satisfaction is measured by a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility
functional. Notice also that our model is in a sense simpler than Machina’s,
since our local utility function depends upon distribution T only through the
one-dimensional anticipated payog |W(T).
10Machina (1982, 1987) showed how the GEU model can solve the Allais’
paradoxes, which is often referred to as the “fanning out” of indigerence
curves in the Marschak-Machina triangle. In Machina (1982, Theorem 5),
it is shown that solving the paradox requires that any FSD-dominated shift
in distribution T reduces the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion of the local utility
function P> which is measured by Pff(f>T)@Pf(f>T), for all f and for all
T 5 S.
Proposition 4 The preference functional Z fans out — and can thereby ex-
plain the Allais’ paradoxes — if and only if the absolute aversion to the objec-
tive risk is increasing in the anticipated payog, i.e., if
C
C|
μ

Xff(f>|)
Xf(f>|)
¶
 0( 1 1 )
for all (f>|).
Proof: Let T()=( t1()>===>tV()) be the vector of objective probabilities
parametrized by . Suppose that any marginal increase in  deteriorates T
in the sense of FSD dominance. We must prove that P(f>T()) has a local
risk aversion that is uniformly reduced by this increase in .O b s e r v e t h a t
this local risk aversion is measured by

CPff(f>T())
CPf(f>T())
= 
Xff(f>|W(T()))
Xf(f>|W(T()))
=
From Proposition 2, we know that |W is decreasing in = This implies that
the local risk aversion is reduced by any increase in  if condition (11) is
satisﬁed. ¥
We believe that it is intuitive that an increase in the anticipated payog
raises the aversion to the objective risk. For example, it is easy to check that
this condition requires that X| be concave in f, a condition that we have
identiﬁed in Proposition 2 as necessary and sucient for any increase in the
objective risk to reduce the optimal anticipated payog.T h u s , o u r m o d e l
provides a psychological motivation to the well-documented phenomenon of
fanning out preferences (Machina, 1987).
Let us show how this model can solve the Allais’ paradoxes by using the
additive habit speciﬁcation. It is easy to check that this speciﬁcation satisﬁes
11condition (11) under the standard assumption of prudence (x000  0). Let
X(f>|)=( 1+f|)13@(1)> with  =1 @2= We also assume that  =4 ,
a number that belongs to the range of risk aversion that most economists
believe is reasonable. Let us also assume that n = 1, which means that the
agent weights ex ante and ex post satisfactions equally when measuring his
intertemporal welfare.
Lottery T| W (T) Z (T)
d1
t1 =0
t2 =1
t3 =0
1=0000 0=1957
d2
t1 =0 =01
t2 =0 =89
t3 =0 =1
0=8574 0=2088
d3
t1 =0 =9
t2 =0
t3 =0 =1
0=0263 0=6328
d4
t1 =0 =89
t2 =0 =11
t3 =0
0=0273 0=6339
Table 1: The optimal anticipated payog and the intertemporal
welfare for Allais’ common consequence egect, with n =1a n d
X(f>|)=(1 + f  |@2)33@3.
The ﬁrst Allais’ paradox, the common consequence egect, is about two
choice problems concerning four lotteries, d1>d 2, d3 and d4> and three possible
payogs, f1 =0 >f 2 =1a n df3 = 5. Lottery d1 is a sure gain of f =1 .
It is easy to check that the optimal anticipated payog is |W
1 =1i ft h i s
lottery is selected, yielding Z1 = 0=1975. The other lotteries, their optimal
anticipated payog, and the resulting intertemporal welfare are summarized
in Table 1. The prediction of the EU model is that if d1 is preferred to d2,
then it must be that d4 is preferred to d3.T h i si sn o tt h ec a s ei no u rm o d e l ,
since d1 is indeed preferred to d2> but d3 is preferred to d4.
The intuition for why our model can explain the Allais’ paradox is quite
simple. The preference of d1 over d2 indicates a high degree of risk aversion,
whereas the preference of d3 over d4 indicates a smaller one. This reduction
12in risk aversion in the second choice context is explained by the fact that
it is much less favorable to the agent than in the ﬁrst choice context. This
induces the agent to optimally reduce his expectations, from |W around 1
to |W around 0. We then get the observed preference reversal by observing
that our additive habit speciﬁcation implies a reduction in the agent’s risk
aversion when his expectations fall.
T h es a m ee gect can also explain the second Allais’ paradox, the common
ratio egect. Again, the paradox is about two choice problems concerning
four lotteries, e1>e 2, e3 and e4> and three possible payogs, f1 =0 >f 2 =0 =3
and f3 =0 =48. Lottery e1 is a sure gain of f2 =0 =3, and lottery e2 is a
gamble with gain f3 =0 =48 with probability 0=8. Lotteries e3 and e4 diger
from lotteries e1 and e2 in their probabilities with a common ratio of 4.
Lottery T| W (T) Z (T)
e1
t1 =0
t2 =1
t3 =0
0=3000 0=4383
e2
t1 =0 =2
t2 =0
t3 =0 =8
0=2704 0=4406
e3
t1 =0 =75
t2 =0 =25
t3 =0
0=0449 0=6194
e4
t1 =0 =8
t2 =0
t3 =0 =2
0=0434 0=6188
Table 2: The optimal anticipated payog and the intertemporal
welfare for Allais’ common ratio egect, with n =1a n dX(f>|)=
(1 + f  |@2)33@3.
The prediction of the EU model is that if e1 is preferred to e2 then e3
must be preferred to e4. Table 2 shows that preferences are reversed in our
model. This is again due to the reduced anticipated payog |W in the choice
between e3 and e4, which reduces the individual’s degree of risk aversion.
133.3 The special case of additive habits
We suppose in this section that there exists an increasing and concave func-
tion x and a positive scalar  such that X(f>|)=x(f  |)= The ﬁrst-order
condition for this additive habit speciﬁcation is written as
n(1  )x
0((1  )|
W)=Hx
0(e f  |
W)> (12)
where e f is the random variable distributed as T= Notice that the second-order
condition is automatically satisﬁed. The following proposition describes some
basic properties of the optimal expectations.
Proposition 5 Suppose that X(f>|)=x(f  |). The optimal anticipated
payog satisﬁes the following properties.
1. |W is smaller than the expected payog  = Pvtvfv if n is smaller or
equal to @(1  ) and x0 is convex.
2. Suppose that e f =  + e % and that n = @(1  )= We have that g|W@g
is larger than unity if x is standard, i.e., if D(})=x00(})@x0(}) and
S(})=x000(})@x00(}) are two nonincreasing functions.
Proof: Property 1 comes from the following sequence of inequalities:
Hx
0(e f  |
W)  x
0(  |
W)  n(1  )x
0(  |
W)=
Combining this with (12) implies that (1  )|W    |W> or equivalently,
|W  . The second property is obtained by fully digerentiating (12) with
respect to |W and , and by eliminating n. This yields
g|W
g
=
Hx00(e f  |W)
Hx0(e f  |W)
·
(1  )
x00((1  )|W)
x0((1  )|W)
+ 
Hx00(e f  |W)
Hx0(e f  |W)
¸31
 0=
(13)
It implies that g|W@g is larger than unity if
Hx00(e f  |W)
Hx0(e f  |W)

x00((1  )|W)
x0((1  )|W)
>
where |W is such that x0((1  )|W)=Hx0(e f  |W)= As shown by Kimball
(1993), this is true if and only if x is standard.¥
14When n equals @(1), the optimal anticipated payog is equal to the sure
payog if there is no objective uncertainty, and is smaller than the objective
expected payog when the outcome is risky and x is prudent. When all payogs
are increased by $1, the optimal anticipated payog is increased by more than
$1 if x is standard.3
We now examine the agent’s attitude toward small risks around some sure
payog . To do this, let us deﬁne the local utility function p()=P(>),
where  denotes the random variable degenerated at .I ti sd e ﬁ n e da s
p()=nx((1  )|()) + x(  |())>
where |() is the optimal anticipated payog when the lottery gives  with
certainty. Let W(})=x0(})@x00(})a n dWp()=p0()@p00()d e n o t et h e
indices of absolute risk tolerance of x and p, respectively. After some tedious
manipulations using (13), we obtain that
Wp()=( 1 )
31 [W((1  )|()) + (1  )W(  |())]= (14)
In the following proposition, we assume that x belongs to the familiar HARA
utility set. A utility function is HARA if its absolute risk tolerance is linear,
as is the case for exponential, power, logarithmic, and quadratic utility func-
tions.
Proposition 6 Suppose that X(f>|)=x(f  |) and x is HARA with
x0(})@x00(})=d + e}.I f d =0(power utility functions), then the de-
gree of tolerance to any small objective risk is independent of n and .I fd
is positive (negative), then the degree of tolerance to any small objective risk
is increasing (decreasing) in .
Proof: This is a direct consequence of equation (14), which can be rewrit-
ten in this case as
Wp()=
d
1  
+ e.
If d is positive (zero, negative), Wp() is increasing (constant, decreasing) in
. ¥
3To illustrate, the power functions and the logaritmic function are standard.
154 Optimal decision making
In this section, we examine optimal decision-making under uncertainty with
preferences as speciﬁed in Section 2. We are particularly interested in the im-
pact of anticipatory feelings and disappointment relative to EU preferences.
For this purpose, we present two settings: portfolio choice and insurance
demand.
4.1 Portfolio choice problem
We investigate the standard one-safe-one-risky-asset model. The agent has
some initial wealth }0 that can be invested in a safe asset whose return is
normalized to zero and in a risky asset whose excess return is described by
random variable e {. The agent must determine his dollar investment  in the
risky asset. He selects , which maximizes his intertemporal welfare Z()
deﬁned as
Z()= m a x
|min$|$|max
ny(|)+HX(}0 + e {>|)> (15)
where |min and |max are the exogenously given minimum and maximum pos-
sible expectations. We can solve this problem for each , thereby yielding
the optimal anticipated payog |() as a function of the demand for the risky
asset. It satisﬁes the following condition:
ny
0(|()) + HX|(}0 + e {>|())
;
?
=
 0 li |()=|min
=0 li |() 5 [|min>| max]
 0 li |()=|max=
(16)
We assume that z is concave in = By the envelope theorem, the ﬁrst-order
condition for the portfolio problem is written as
Z
0(
W)=He {Xf(}0 + 
We {>|
W)=0 > (17)
where |W = |(W). Because the utility function X is concave in the ﬁnal
payog, we directly obtain the following result.
Proposition 7 The demand for the risky asset is positive (zero, negative) if
the expected excess return is positive (zero, negative).
16P r o o f : B e c a u s ew ea s s u m et h a tZ is concave in ,t h eo p t i m a lW is
positive (zero, negative) if Z0(0) is positive (zero, negative). But we have
that
Z
0(0) = He {Xf(}0>|(0)) = Xf(}0>|(0))He {=
Because Xf is positive, we can conclude that the sign of W and of He { must
coincide. ¥
Because our model yields a smooth local utility function that is concave
in the ﬁnal payog, it exhibits second-order risk aversion as in the standard
EU model. Proposition 7 conﬁrms this point.
We now analyze comparative statics for the additive habit speciﬁcation
X(f>|)=x(f  |) for an increasing and concave function x and a positive
scalar ?1. The following proposition describes the egect that changes in
the intensity of anticipatory feelings, n, and of disappointment, ,h a v eo n
the portfolio allocation of the decision maker.
Proposition 8 Suppose that X(f>|)=x(f  |) and x is DARA.
1. The allocation in the risky asset is decreasing in n.
2. The allocation in the risky asset is decreasing in (increasing in, inde-
pendent of)  if relative risk aversion is uniformly larger than (smaller
than, equal to) unity.
Proof: See Appendix A.1. ¥
For the additive habit speciﬁcation, DARA is equivalent to absolute
risk aversion being increasing in the anticipated payog,s e e( 1 1 ) . A ni n -
crease in the intensity of anticipatory feelings raises the anticipated payog
and thereby increases the degree of risk aversion. This explains the some-
what surprising result that the individual with anticipatory feelings forms
a less risky portfolio. Increasing the intensity of ex-post disappointment
has two opposing egects. First, it increases the degree of risk aversion, as
C@C(Xff(f>|)@Xf(f>|))  0. Second, it decreases the anticipated payog
and thereby reduces the degree of risk aversion. We have shown that if rela-
tive risk aversion is larger than 1 then the ﬁrst egect dominates the second.
Under these conditions, individuals with anticipatory feeling and ex-post
disappointment select a portfolio that is less risky compared to the tradi-
tional EU model. Both psychological phenomena therefore speak to the
17equity premium puzzle.4 Note that this egect applies to both optimistic and
pessimistic individuals. This stands in contrast to the literature on optimal
expectations (Brunnermeier and Parker, 2005, and Gollier, 2005) in which
individuals are always optimistic and select a riskier portfolio, reinforcing the
equity premium puzzle.
Illustrative portfolio example To illustrate the ege c tt h a ta n t i c i p a t o r y
feeling and ex-post disappointment have on the optimal decision, we consider
the case X(f>|)=l n ( f  |). Suppose that the return of the risky asset ˜ {
under the objective probability distribution takes a value {+ or {3 with equal
likelihood and {+ A 0 A{ 3. Solving the two ﬁrst-order conditions (16) and
(13) for | and  we derive, after some manipulation,
|
W =
n
(n +1 )
· }0
and

W = 
{+ + {3
2(n +1 ){+{3 · }0.
As in the EU model with CRRA, the optimal allocation in the risky asset
is proportional to the initial wealth, and it is strictly positive if the equity
premium is strictly positive, i.e. {+ + {3 A 0. It is decreasing in the inten-
sity of anticipatory feeling (CW@Cn ? 0) and independent of the intensity of
ex-post disappointment (CW@C = 0). Compared to the EU model, individ-
uals with anticipatory feelings thus form a less risky portfolio. The optimal
anticipated payog is also proportional to the initial wealth and independent
of the actual values of returns, {+ and {3. It is increasing in the intensity of
anticipatory feeling (C|W@Cn A 0) and decreasing in the intensity of ex-post
disappointment (C|W@C ? 0).
4.2 Demand for insurance
In this section, we apply our decision criterion to an insurance purchase
decision. The agent is endowed with initial wealth }0 and is facing a loss of
4Ang et al. (2005) apply Gul’s (1991) disappointment preferences to a portfolio choice
problem and show that individuals who are averse to disappointment hold signiﬁcantly
less equity. Our result predicts that individuals who additionally have anticipatory feelings
will hold even less equity.
18random size ˜ o. He can buy coinsurance at a rate  for a premium (1 + )H˜ o,
where  denotes the proportional loading factor. The agent chooses the
coinsurance rate  to maximize his intertemporal welfare
Z ()= m a x
|min$|$|max
ny(|)+HX
³
}0  (1  )˜ o  (1 + )H˜ o>|
´
.
This problem is equivalent to the portfolio allocation problem where full
insurance,  = 1, is equivalent to investing all wealth into the risk-free asset,
 = 0. We therefore obtain the following result, which mirrors Proposition
7.
Proposition 9 If insurance is actuarially fair ( =0 ) then full coverage is
optimal. If insurance is actuarially unfair (A0) then partial coverage is
optimal.
This is a direct consequence of Machina (1982), who has shown that most
classical results in insurance are obtained in his Generalized Expected Utility
model as long as the “local utility function” P is concave in outcomes. In
our special case, concavity of P is implied by the concavity of X (f>|)i nf,
see (10).
Analogous to Proposition 8, we obtain the following comparative statics
of the optimal insurance amount with respect to changes in n and .
Proposition 10 Suppose that X(f>|)=x(f  |) and x is DARA.
1. The amount of insurance coverage is increasing in n.
2. The amount of insurance coverage is increasing in (decreasing in, inde-
pendent of)  if relative risk aversion is uniformly larger than (smaller
than, equal to) unity.
If relative risk aversion is uniformly larger than one, individuals with an-
ticipatory feelings and ex post disappointment buy more insurance compared
to the EU model. This result is consistent with the observation that individ-
uals have a preference for low deductibles - see e.g. Pashigian et al. (1966),
Cohen and Einav (2006), Sydnor (2006).
19Illustrative insurance example We extend our previous example to the
insurance purchase decision. Assume X(f>|)=l n ( f  |) and suppose that
there is a loss of size o with probability t and no loss with probability 1  t
where t?1@(1 + ). Solving the ﬁrst-order conditions for | and  yields
|
W =
n(}0  (1 + )to)
(n +1 )
and

W =
(1 + )(1 t)o  }0
(1 + )(1 (1 + )t)o
+
n (}0  (1 + )to)
(n +1 )( 1 (1 + )t)(1+)o
where the ﬁrst term in the sum is the optimal coinsurance rate predicted by
the traditional EU model. In our model, the optimal insurance amount is
increasing in the intensity of anticipatory feeling (CW@Cn A 0) and indepen-
dent of the intensity of ex-post disappointment (CW@C = 0). Individuals
with anticipatory feelings therefore buy more insurance than predicted by the
EU model. The optimal anticipated payog is increasing in the intensity of
anticipatory feeling (C|W@Cn A 0) and decreasing in the intensity of ex-post
disappointment (C|W@C ? 0).
It is interesting to note that the smaller the “stakes” are, i.e. the larger
}0  (1 + )to, the higher the anticipated payog is. This signiﬁes that the
individual’s degree of risk aversion is higher with smaller stakes, which implies
a higher optimal amount of insurance coverage relative to the one predicted
by the EU model. This is consistent with Rabin’s calibration theorem (2000),
which shows that the EU model implies that a measurable degree of risk
aversion to small stake gambles should exhibit an unreasonably high degree
of risk aversion to large stake gambles. In our model, the degree of risk
aversion is decreasing in the amount of the stakes as the individual lowers
his anticipated payog.
5C o n c l u s i o n
We proposed a new decision criterion under uncertainty by allowing individ-
uals to extract utility from dreaming about the future and disutility from
being disappointed ex post. Individuals then have an incentive to manipu-
late their beliefs about the future. We have described the mental process of
20how beliefs are formed to manage the trade-og between savoring and being
disappointed. The preferences derived from this process are consistent with
the Allais’ paradoxes, the equity premium puzzle, and the preference for low
deductibles in insurance contracts.
AA p p e n d i x : P r o o f s
A.1 Proof of Proposition 8
Implicitly digerentiating (12) with respect to n, ,a n d for e f = }0 + e {
yields
|
W
n = 
(1  )x0((1  )|W)
n(1  )2x00((1  )|W)+2Hx00(}0 + e {  |W)
>
|
W
 =
nx0((1  )|W)+n(1  )|Wx00((1  )|W)  2|WHx00(}0 + e {  |W)
n(1  )2x00((1  )|W)+3Hx00(}0 + e {  |W)
>
|
W
 =
He {x00(}0 + e {  |W)
n(1  )2x00((1  )|W)+2Hx00(}0 + e {  |W)
.( 1 8 )
Note that |W
n A 0a n d|W
 ? 0a t = W as x DARA implies H [˜ {x00 (}0 + W˜ {  |W)] A
0. Implicitly digerentiating the ﬁrst-order condition for W,
He {x
0(}0 + 
We {  |
W)=0 , ( 1 9 )
where W = W (n>)a n d|W = |W (W (n>)>n>), with respect to n implies

W
n =
|W
nHe {x00(}0 + We {  |W)
He {2x00(}0 + We {  |W)  |W
He {x00(}0 + We {  |W)
.
The numerator is positive under x DARA and the denominator can be written
as
He {
2x
00(}0 + 
We {  |
W)  |
W
He {x
00(}0 + 
We {  |
W)
=
μ
n(1  )2x00((1  )|W)He {2x00(}0 + We {  |W)
+2 ¡
Hx00(}0 + e {  |W)He {2x00(}0 + We {  |W)  (He {x00(}0 + e {  |W))
2¢
¶
n(1  )2x00((1  )|W)+2Hx00(}0 + e {  |W)
? 0. (20)
21The last inequality follows from the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality which im-
plies Hx00(}0 +e {|W)He {2x00(}0 +We {|W)(He {x00(}0 + e {  |W))
2 =
Hx00(}0+e {|W)H (e {  1)
2 x00(}0+We {|W)(H (e {  1)x00(}0 + e {  |W))
2 
0. This proves W
n ? 0. Implicitly digerentiating (19) with respect to  yields

W
 =
¡
|W + |W

¢
He {x00(}0 + We {  |W)
He {2x00(}0 + We {  |W)  |W
He {x00(}0 + We {  |W)
.
The denominator is negative as shown above. DARA implies He {x00(}0 +
We {  |W) A 0a n dt h u svljq
¡
W

¢
= vljq
¡
|W + |W

¢
. Furthermore
|
W + |
W
 =
nx0((1  )|W)(1 Du ((1  )|W))
n(1  )2x00((1  )|W)+2Hx00(}0 + e {  |W)
where Du (})=}x00(})@x0 (}). This implies W
 ? (A>=) 0 ig Du ((1  )|W) A
(?>=) 1.
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